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JURISDICTION 
This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has Jurisdiction to decide cross-
appellants' appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Issue: Did the district court err by ruling that there was no violation of 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 11 and denying defendant's motion for sanctions? 
Standard of Review: "Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation 
of Rule 11 is a question of law." Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180, 193-94 
(Utah Ct.App-.1997), citing Taylorv. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989); and Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 1992) ("The trial 
court's ultimate conclusion that rule 11 was violated . . . [is] reviewed under the 
correction of error standard."). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 11 - Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
representations to court; sanctions. 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall 
be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's 
individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, 
shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's 
address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be 
verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be 
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after 
being called to the attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written 
motion, or other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, 
submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party 
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is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein 
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or 
the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have 
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely 
to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity 
for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the 
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably 
based on a lack of information or belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to 
respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been 
violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, 
impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or 
parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the 
violation. 
(1) How initiated. 
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule 
shall be made separately from other motions or 
requests and shall describe the specific conduct 
alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as 
provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or 
presented to the court unless, within 21 days after 
service of the motion (or such other period as the 
court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, 
defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not 
withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, 
the court may award to the party prevailing on the 
motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees 
incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In 
appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held 
jointly responsible for violations committed by its 
partners, members, and employees. 
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(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court 
may enter an order describing the specific conduct 
that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing 
an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it 
has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for 
violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to 
deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by 
others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in 
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or 
include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay 
a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted 
for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the 
movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and 
other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against 
a represented party for a violation of subdivision 
(b)(2). 
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the 
court's initiative unless the court issues its order to 
show cause before a voluntary dismissal or 
settlement of the claims made by or against the party 
which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe 
the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule 
and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this 
rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, 
objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 
26 through 37. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff and appellant, Layne D. Hess ("Hess") brought by this action to be 
reimbursed for the expenses he incurred and gifts he made in his ultimately-
unsuccessful courtship of defendant, Jody [Johanna] Johnston ("Johnston"), including 
3 
such items as one-half (!4) of vacation costs, contending post hoc that his payment for 
all expenses was a conditional gift or constitutes unjust enrichment, because Johnston 
later decided not to follow-through on her promise to marry Hess. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Hess' complaint against Johnston was filed after Hess, through counsel, made 
written demand for the sums later demanded in his complaint. On October 17, 2005, 
Johnston, through counsel, responded to that demand, referring Hess to Jackson v. 
Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), which abolished any "independent action" for breach 
of promise to marry. R. 16. 
In response, Hess filed his complaint (R. 1-11). On or about November 19, 
2005, in accordance with the requirements of UTAH R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A), Johnston 
mailed to Hess' counsel a proposed motion for sanctions and supporting memorandum 
(R.22), requesting that the complaint be withdrawn. Hess refused to dismiss his 
complaint and Johnston's motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions were filed on 
January 9, 2006. R. 22-23 and R. 14-15. 
A hearing was held on Johnston's motions on April 10, 2006. R. 60. 
C. Disposition By Trial Court. 
The trial court dismissed the complaint, with prejudice, but denied Johnston's 
motion for sanctions, noting that it was not persuaded the action was filed frivolously. 
R.62. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the well pleaded factual allegations of the 
complaint are to be taken as true. Johnston, therefore, accepts the Statement of Facts 
contained in Hess' opening brief. Johnston supplements those facts with the following 
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facts: 
1. Hess' claims relating to the engagement ring given to Johnston relate only 
to Hess' allegation that he has been unable to re-sell the ring for the full price he paid to 
obtain it. Hess does not allege that Johnston damaged the ring or did anything to 
decrease its market value. 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hess' complaint contained four causes of action: (1) Unjust Enrichment; (2) 
Conditional Gift; (3) Promissory Estoppel; and (4) Breach of Contract. Each claim is 
based upon Hess' attempt to recover courtship expenses. Hess says as much in his 
opening brief. 
The trial court erred in holding that the abolishment of the cause of 
action for breach of a promise to marry by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Jackson v. Brown 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), bars Mr. Hess' 
claims for restitution of the expenses and losses he has incurred or 
will incur as a result of his courtship of Ms. Johnston. 
Hess Opening Brief at 8. The trial court correctly rejected Hess' arguments. Had it not 
done so, the binding precedent of the Utah Supreme Court in Jackson v. Brown, 904 
P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), would have been rendered a complete nullity. At core, Hess' 
argument is simply that: "If [he] had known that Ms. Johnston did not wi[s]h to marry 
him, he would not have incurred the expenses . . . . " Hess Brief at 7. In other words, 
had Johnston not changed her mind about the marriage, we would not find ourselves 
before the court now. That claim, irrespective of its name, is a breach of promise to 
marry; a cause of action that no longer exists in this state. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED JACKSON V. BROWN IN DISMISSING 
HESS' COMPLAINT. 
In 1995, the Utah Supreme Court abolished any cause of action for breach of a 
marriage promise, in Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685, 687 (Utah 1995)("in light of 
modern customs and jurisprudence we now abolish the cause of action in this state.") 
The express rationale for abolition of the cause of action was that it was against the 
public policy of this state, for the following reasons: 
However, we see no benefit in discouraging or penalizing persons 
who realize, before making these vows, that for whatever reason, 
they are unprepared to take such an important step. Plaintiff in 
this case concedes that if we were to uphold the action, any time 
an engaged party were to cancel wedding plans for any reason, the 
other party would have a prima facie case for breach of promise to 
marry. Such an action would be highly susceptible to abuse by 
persons whose feelings are damaged by a former fiancee's 
decision to cancel a wedding. In Norton, we held that actions so 
manipulate and vulnerable to this type of abuse are 
"counterproductive" to the good of the state. 
Id. The instant action represents just such an abusive effort, by a jilted boyfriend. 
Indeed, there is not even an allegation of any expense incurred in wedding 
preparations, such as the dictum in Jackson (which dictum was, itself, rejected by the 
majority of Justices voting) might allow. 
Hess' complaint is nothing but a thinly-veiled effort to plead around Jackson by 
clinging to dictum, alleging the facts for a breach of promise action, but cloaking those 
facts in other names. Hess was unsuccessful in courting Johnston's affections. No 
cause of action exists to allow him to sue her to recover his courtship expenditures. 
The Complaint alleges: "In July 2004, Mr. Hess and Ms. Johnston began serious 
discussions about getting married, and decided that they would get married,...." (fl 13, 
6 
Complaint, R. 2) "While in France [September, 2004], Mr. Hess formally proposed to 
Ms. Johnston." (fl 29, R. 4) "Ms. Johnston accepted Mr. Hess' proposal, and Mr. Hess 
gave Ms. Johnston the engagement ring." fl| 30, R. 4) "In late April 2005, without any 
forewarning or explanation, Ms. Johnston broke off the engagement with Mr. Hess." (fl 
46, R. 5) "Mr. Hess would not have incurred the expenses of the Alaska cruise, the trip 
to France, the vasectomy requested by Ms. Johnston, the purchase of the engagement 
ring, and the purchase of a vehicle for Ms. Johnston's son, but for Ms. Johnston's 
promise to marry him." fl| 49, R. 6) If we all knew the future, none of us would make a 
false step. 
A single Justice set forth as dictum in the Jackson opinion, that "any economic 
losses suffered because of Jackson's reasonable reliance upon Brown's promise to 
marry her (such as normal expenses attendant to a wedding) may be recoverable 
under a theory of reasonable reliance or breach of contract." Jackson, 904 P.2d at 687 
(emphasis added). That dictum was expressly not adopted as the law of this state, by 
the majority of the Justices. See id. at 688 ("I concur in most of the majority opinion but 
cannot concur in the dictum that 'any economic losses suffered because of Jackson's 
reasonable reliance on Brown's promise to marry her (such as normal expenses 
attendant to a wedding) may be recoverable under a theory of reasonable reliance or 
breach of contract. [Emphasis added]'") (Stewart, A.C.J., concurring, joined by 
Zimmerman, C.J. and Russon, J). The law of this state plainly is that any cause of 
action for breach of promise was, and is, abolished. No public policy is served by 
allowing Hess to abuse Johnston because he now wishes he had not spent money 
courting her. 
For purposes of determining whether a cause of action is recognized in the State 
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of Utah, it does not matter how the legal theories in a pleading are labeled, it is the 
subject matter of the pleading that is determinative. Lund v. District Court, 62 P.2d 278, 
280 (Utah 1936). Where a cause of action has been expressly abolished as violative of 
the public policy of the state, it is abolished in all its forms. See 12 AM. JUR. 2D. Breach 
of Promise § 14 ("Generally speaking, any action based upon or arising out of a breach 
of contract to marry is barred under a statute abolishing such actions, irrespective of the 
nature of the damages or relief sought, or the grounds alleged for such a recovery."). 
By example, where a breach of promise cause of action is barred, "promissory 
estoppel" is likewise barred. See Turner v. Shavers, 96 Ohio App.3d 769, 770, 645 
N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) ("We agree with the trial court that the breach 
of promise theory is expressly barred by R.C. 2305.29. We further agree that 
promissory estoppel does not apply, since recovery on the underlying "contract" to wed 
has been barred by R.C. 2305.29.") 
An analogous matter was decided in Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 
1997), where the Utah Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether the 
judicial proceedings privilege applied to causes of action other than defamation. See 
id. at 1258. This issue arose in Price, like it does here, because a plaintiff seeking to 
avoid the plain effect of the law on a cause of action, there, defamation, cloaked the 
same claim for damages caused by a defamatory statement in a different label, viz., 
"intentional interference with business relations." Id. 
The Court commenced its analysis by examining the public policy behind the 
judicial proceedings privilege. See id. ("The whole purpose of the judicial privilege is to 
ensure free and open expression by all participants in judicial proceedings by alleviating 
any and all fear that participation will subject them to the risk of subsequent legal 
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actions.") In light of that public policy, the conclusion was inescapable that all causes of 
action based on damages alleged to flow from defamatory statements, whether called 
defamation, interference or otherwise, were barred by the public policy: 
There is no reason to distinguish statements that may defame a 
person from statements that may interfere with that person's 
business relations. The purpose of the judicial privilege remains 
the same. Holding that a defamatory statement made during a 
judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged but then holding that the 
privilege does not apply to the claim that the statement interfered 
with a business relation would defeat the very purpose of the 
privilege and would chill free and open expression in the judicial 
setting. 
Id. Likewise, here, no matter what he calls it, Hess purports to claim damages due to 
the fact that Johnston breached her promise to marry. The very purpose of the Utah 
Supreme Court's abolition of the tort of breach of promise to marry, as a matter of 
public policy, would be defeated if Hess could plead the same facts, call the cause of 
action by a different name, and be allowed to proceed. Hess' effort to survive in 
asserting an outlawed cause of action, by the simple expedient of calling it something 
else, is sanctionable and his claims were appropriately dismissed, with prejudice. 
II. No REMEDY OF RESTITUTION IS AVAILABLE, UNDER THE RUBRIC OF UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL OR OTHERWISE, FOR COURTSHIP 
EXPENSES. 
Hess' claims are even less meritorious when one considers that, even in the 
rejected-dictum in Jackson, there was no suggestion that courtship expenses or gifts 
made during courtship could be recoverable. That dictum spoke only of expenses of a 
planned wedding. There can be no "unjust enrichment" when Hess benefitted through 
the courtship by the company of a human being he chose to pursue. The apparent 
suggestion that baubles or trips have some greater intrinsic value than the sought-after 
company of a woman, in its best light, would purport to equate women with property, a 
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concept anathema to this society. Asserting a claim on such a basis is sanctionable. 
Having had Johnston's company on the trips, which is presumably what he desired, 
Hess cannot establish that he conferred upon Johnston a benefit "under circumstances 
that would make it unjust for the Johnston to retain the benefit without paying for it." 
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Johnston has found no Utah case supporting the existence of a cause of action 
for "conditional gift" for courtship expenses. Even if a "conditional gift" might have been 
recovered under law, however, when the condition was the consummation of a promise 
to marry, the abolition of relief for breach of promise, based on public policy, precludes 
such action now. In any event, it is by no means clear that such a claim has ever 
existed under Utah law. Utah law does not allow a "gift" without donative intent and 
donative intent is not conditional. See West v. West, 387 P.2d 686, 688-89 & n.1 (Utah 
1963). Most importantly, though, Hess' claim does not relate to gifts specifically tied to 
the condition of marriage, such as an engagement ring might be, but only, again, to 
courtship expenses. Hess' "contingent gift" claim is just another cynical effort to abuse 
Johnston because she decided not to marry him. 
Since no Utah cases seem to support such a cause of action, Johnston looks to 
the American Law Institute's official promulgation of the common law in the 
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937) ["RESTATEMENT"].1 The RESTATEMENT provision 
on point states: 
A person who has conferred a benefit upon another, manifesting 
1Although a RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION went through several drafts 
in the 1980s, the project was abandoned without issuance by the Commissioners of the 
American Law Institute. There currently is a RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION 
effort underway, but as yet, it has not gone beyond the tentative draft stages. 
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that he does not expect compensation therefor, is not entitled to 
restitution merely because his expectation that an existing relation 
will continue or that a future relation will come into existence is not 
realized, unless the conferring of the benefit is conditioned thereon. 
Id. § 58. Comment c to RESTATEMENT § 58 makes plain that there are only two limited 
circumstances where such restitutionary remedy would ever exist when a marriage did 
not occur: First, "[ i ] f . . . the donee obtained the gift fraudulently . . .." Id. comment c. 
Second, "if the gift was made for a purpose which could be achieved only by the 
marriage . . .." Id. Thus, a gift, by a parent, of a car, to a putative future son-in-law, "[i]n 
anticipation of a honeymoon motor trip" is recoverable because the "purpose" of a 
honeymoon motor trip could be achieved only by the marriage. See id., illustration 6. 
Thus, no cause of action could exist for a gift of a truck to Johnston's son, because the 
purpose of that gift could not be achieved "only by the marriage." Further, as to the gift 
of the "truck" to Johnston's son, not only is it unrelated to the condition of marriage, 
Johnston is not even the donee. 
But the lack of merit in Hess' complaint does not end there. Comment c further 
acknowledges in the common law an absolute limit as to the nature of the items for 
which restitution might be obtained, even if the break-up by the donee is wrongful: 
If there is an engagement to marry and the donee, having received 
the gift without fraud, later wrongfully breaks the promise of 
marriage, the donor is entitled to restitution if the gift is an 
engagement ring, a family heirloom or other similar thing intimately 
connected with the marriage, but not if the gift is one of money 
intended to be used by the donee before the marriage. 
RESTATEMENT § 58, comment c. Hess does not sue over (1) an engagement ring;2 a 
2Johnston returned the ring long before suit was filed. 
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family heirloom;3 or (3) some other, similar thing intimately connected with the 
marriage.4 
Illustration 7 of the RESTATEMENT is right on point: 
A makes gifts of money and of family heirlooms to B who has 
promised to marry him. B spends the money for living expenses as 
was expected but retains the jewelry. Later B comes to the 
conclusion that she does not wish to marry A and refuses to do so. 
A is not entitled to restitution of the money but is entitled to the 
return of the heirlooms. 
RESTATEMENT § 58, illustration 7 (emphasis added). Hess spent money during, and as 
part of, an ultimately unsuccessful courtship. In addition to Utah having abolished the 
cause of action for breach of promise and having never recognized unjust enrichment 
or conditional gifts for courtship expenses, the common law as recognized and officially 
promulgated by the American Law Institute makes clear that no cause of action could 
exist for what Hess has alleged. 
A. Authorities Relied Upon By Hess From Other Jurisdictions Are 
Inapposite. 
Finding no support in Utah law, Hess turns to other jurisdictions for support of his 
position. Not only are those cases consistent with the RESTATEMENT, they also support 
dismissal and an award of sanctions against Hess. 
Piccininni v. Hajus, 180 Conn. 369, 429 A.2d 886 (1980), is Hess' leading case. 
Analyzed in its entirety, however Piccininni is perfectly consistent with the RESTATEMENT 
principles: 
The Act [abolishing so-called "heart-balm" actions for breach 
of the promise to marry] does not preclude an action for 
3None were given to Johnston. 
4None given to Johnston. 
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restitution of specific property or money transferred in 
reliance on various false and fraudulent representations, apart 
from any promise to marry, as to their intended use. 
180 Conn, at 373, 429 A.2d at 888-89 (emphasis added). The Court held: 
In sum, the gravamen of the second count is that the plaintiff 
was induced to transfer property to the defendant in reliance upon 
her fraudulent representations that she intended to marry him 
and that the property transferred would be used for their 
mutual benefit and enjoyment The plaintiff does not here assert 
that the defendant wronged him in failing to marry him; rather, he is 
asserting that the defendant wronged him in fraudulently inducing 
him to transfer property to her. 
Id., 180 Conn, at 374 (emphasis added). Thus, the cause of action in Piccicicci was 
apart from the promise to marry; it arose instead from the fraudulent representation 
made as to the intended use of the property transferred. See Brown v. Strum, 350 
F.Supp.2d 346, 351 (D. Conn. 2004) (discussing Piccicicci as limited in its scope). 
Johnston acknowledges that the RESTATEMENT recognizes fraud claims: "Comment c to 
RESTATEMENT § 58 makes plain that there are only two limited circumstances where 
such restitutionary remedy would ever exist when a marriage did not occur: First, 
"[i]f...the donee obtained the gift fraudulently . . . . " Id. In fact, Brown interprets 
Piccicicci as standing for the proposition that even fraud-based claims that are not 
"apart from" the promise to marry, were abolished by the Connecticut statute. See 
Brown, 350 F.Supp.2d at 351 ("The Connecticut Supreme Court has also made clear 
that an action for fraud may not be maintained as a method of circumventing § 
52-572b.") 
No claim for fraud was pleaded. Despite what his own legal authorities and the 
Restatement § 58 instruct him, Hess did not amend his Complaint to even attempt to 
assert a claim for fraud. The effort to apply Piccicicci to the facts alleged here is not 
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supportable. 
Hess' next effort to sustain a claim, through Fanning v. Iversen, 535 N.W.2d 770 
(S.D. 1995), is to same effect. There, plaintiff sought recovery of $10,000 that had 
been advanced to the defendant for the specific purpose of use for the cost of the 
anticipated wedding and gifts.. The funds were transmitted by check with the following 
inscription on the memo line: "W.L.-F.W. & G." The finding of the court as to its 
meaning: "With love, for wedding and gifts." Id. at 772. Plaintiff also sought recovery of 
one-half (!4) of a home he had purchased, but placed in both his and his fiancee's 
name once the home became intended as the marital homestead. Fanning recognized 
that such gifts, made clearly in contemplation of the marriage, were conditional and 
subject to return. See id. at 774-75. But these circumstances also fall squarely within 
RESTATEMENT § 58, comment b, which states: 
The gift may be conditional upon the continuance or creation of a 
relation, and if conditional the donor is entitled to its return if the 
relation terminates or is not entered into. The condition may be 
stated in specific words or it may be inferred from the 
circumstances. Likewise, as in the case of engagement and 
wedding gifts, justice may require the creation of a condition 
although the donor had no such condition in mind. 
Id. (emphasis added). Since there was no wedding, the advance for wedding expenses 
and gifts could not be used for the intended purpose. Likewise, since there was no 
wedding, the home could not be used for its intended purpose, as a marital home. In 
such circumstances, the money and interest in the home were held returnable. Here, 
there is no allegation that any gift was made in contemplation of use for a marital 
purpose or for the wedding, itself. To the contrary, Illustration 7 to RESTATEMENT § 58 
shows exactly why the plaintiff in Fanning prevailed, but why, here, Hess has alleged no 
viable claim: 
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7. A makes gifts of money and of family heirlooms to B who has 
promised to marry him. B spends the money for living expenses as 
was expected but retains the jewelry. Later B comes to the 
conclusion that she does not wish to marry A and refuses to do so. 
A is not entitled to restitution of the money but is entitled to the 
return of the heirlooms. 
RESTATEMENT § 58, illustration 7. This illustration is instructive- "Family heirlooms" are 
plainly intended to remain with a "family." The purpose is defeated and they must be 
returned if there is no marriage. Gifts of money, not attached to the wedding, itself, or 
to used for a marital purpose, are absolute gifts and may not be recovered. 
Johnston points out that Utah has not recognized "conditional gifts" of the type 
recognized by the RESTATEMENT and in Fanning, at all. Utah law is clear that a gift 
requires donative intent and Hess' citation to Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 
356 P.2d 631 (1960) does not stand for any contrary proposition. Stone, in its brief 
statement about placing a condition on a charitable gift, did so in the context of refusing 
standing to a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints to contest the 
church's use of church money for a non-church purpose. See id., 11 Utah 2d at 200-
201, 356 P.2d at 633-34. The Court observed that the church member could, if he 
wanted to restrict the use of funds donated, "impose conditions of trust which he could 
require the grantee to agree to in accepting the money." id. Such an agreement does 
not exist in this case, save possibly for the promise to marry, which, as a matter of law, 
cannot sustain a cause of action.5 
5
. It is worth observing that the Montana Supreme Court has accurately 
characterized such "conditional gifts" as, in reality, contracts. See Albingerv. Harris, 
310 Mont. 27, 38, 48 P.3d 711, 719 (2002). According ioAllington, which case, 
incidentally, also discusses Fanning, once such a "conditional gift" is recognized for 
what it really is, a contract, the abolition of a breach of promise cause of action 
abolishes, likewise, any action for the breach of that contract. See id. ("Since actions 
(continued...) 
15 
Hess also cites Wilson v. Dabo, 10 Ohio App.3d 169, 461 N.E.2d 8 (Ct. App. 
1983). Wilson is just another conditional gift case. There are no recitations of what 
property or money was sought to be recovered, so that we cannot examine the "in 
contemplation of marriage" requirement as we could in Fanning" We do know, 
however, that the plaintiff in Wilson alleged, not only that she was entitled to recover 
the value of money and property transferred to the defendant in reliance upon his 
promise of marriage to her, but also that he had promised to return the property and 
money. 461 N.E.2d at 10. We do know that a later Ohio case recognized a promissory 
estoppel claim as abolished,6 and so we can reasonably infer that Dabo must have 
dealt with the same character of property as the RESTATEMENT and Fanning, which 
character of property is not present here. 
Finally, Hess cited McClain v. Gilliam, 389 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). 
This Texas case again applies the "conditional gift" doctrine to gifts "in contemplation of 
marriage." As shown above, no such cause of action has been recognized in Utah, it 
violates Utah's legal requirements for the making of a gift and, in any event, would have 
5(...continued) 
stemming from breach of the contract to marry are barred by our "anti-heart balm" 
statute, Albinger urges the Court to adopt a conditional gift theory patterned on the law 
relevant to a gift in view of death. Under Montana law, no gift is revocable after 
acceptance except a gift in view of death. While some may find marriage to be the end 
of life as one knows it, we are reluctant to analogize gifts in contemplation of marriage 
with a gift in contemplation of death. This Court declines the invitation to create a new 
category of gifting by judicial fiat."). 
6ln Johnston's opening memorandum supporting her motion to dismiss, she cited 
Turner v. Shavers, 96 Ohio App.3d 769, 770, 645 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1994) ("We agree with the trial court that the breach of promise theory is expressly 
barred by R.C. 2305.29. We further agree that promissory estoppel does not apply, 
since recovery on the underlying "contract" to wed has been barred by R.C. 2305.29.") 
R. 27. 
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to be limited to the RESTATEMENT, none of which situations are present in Hess' pleaded 
claims. 
Hess spent his money on having a good time with Johnston. That is not money 
spent "in contemplation of marriage." Hess received back the engagement ring. Hess' 
gift to Johnston's son had no marital purpose. Finally, Hess1 vasectomy was related to 
not having children as the result of sexual relations, not marriage. Following Hess' 
reasoning to its logical conclusion, had the marriage occurred and the parties later 
divorced, Hess would then have a cause of action against Johnston for damages. 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Prior to filing his complaint, Hess was advised that there was no cognizable claim 
in the state of Utah for breach of promise to marry. In compliance with the 
requirements of UTAH R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A), Johnston provided Hess with her proposed 
motion and memorandum requesting sanctions for bringing an action against her that 
contained no claims upon which relief could be granted more than twenty-one days 
prior to filing the motion. 
Despite having had two opportunities to withdraw his demands against Johnston, 
Hess refused to acknowledge the binding precedent of the Utah Supreme Court and 
instead engaged in fatuous arguments attempting to plead around what is clearly an 
action for breach of promise to marry, to create a cause of action where none exists. 
The trial court erred in failing to impose sanctions when there the claims asserted by 
Hess are not warranted "by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law." 
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UTAH R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
ARGUMENT 
III. UTAH HAS ABOLISHED ANY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE MARRIAGE 
PROMISE AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 
As discussed in detail above, the Utah Supreme Court abolished any cause of 
action for breach of a marriage promise in 1995. Despite having been advised of 
binding precedent prior to filing the action, and again shortly thereafter, Hess continued 
to press his claims to recover what he, himself, characterizes as "courtship" expenses. 
Brief of Appellant at 8. The abolition of the cause of action for breach of promise, 
based expressly on the public policy of the state, a fortiori abolishes all causes of action 
predicated on the very breach that public policy says will not support a cause of action. 
Otherwise, public policy would be subjugated to the whimsical imagination of plaintiffs 
attorneys, just as the plaintiffs, themselves, seek to subjugate the women who rejected 
them to the punishment of legal redress for disappointing them. 
"The determination of whether conduct violates Rule 11 is made on an objective 
basis." Giffen v. R.W.L, 913 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah App. 1996) citing Taylor v. Estate of 
Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah App. 1989). A reasonable inquiry into the state of Utah 
law regarding the viability of an action for breach of promise to marry would have 
revealed that no such action existed in Utah. But in this case, Hess was given not one, 
but two opportunities to cease his efforts to recover courtship expenses from Johnston. 
Having been advised in a pre-litigation letter that his cause of action was not 
supportable under Utah law, as well as in the post-complaint motion, Hess reasonably 
should have known his complaint was defective. Since neither the Restatement nor any 
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of the cases Hess relies upon can be read to allow a claim, as pleaded in this case, 
they do not save him from an award of sanctions. Thus, Rule 11 sanctions were 
appropriate. 
The trial court made no findings concerning its determination that the Hess's 
complaint was not frivolous. Because the cause of action had been abolished, Hess' 
complaint is without reasonable basis in law or fact and Johnston should have been 
awarded all of her attorney fees, costs and expenses incurred in defense of Hess' 
frivolous lawsuit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint, 
with prejudice, should be affirmed. The trial court's order denying Johnston's motion for 
sanctions should be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings to 
determine the appropriate amount of sanctions to be imposed on Hess, for all of 
Johnston's attorney fees, costs and expenses, both below and on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of October, 2006. 
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
Professional Corporation 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD 
Attorneys for Johanna Johnston 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief and Appellee's Brief were mailed, 
postage prepaid, this Z£/U/^day of October, 2006, to the following: 
Paxton R. Guymon 
Joel T. Zenger 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
165 South Regent Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David W. Scofield 
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The above-entit]ed matter comes before the Court pursuant L. 
Defendant's Mol inn to Dismiss with Prejudice and for Sanctions. 
The Court heard oral argument with respect to the motion on Apri1 
10, 2006. Fo]]owinq the hearinq, the matter was taken under 
advisement 
The Couit having LuiisidcLed the motion and memoranda and ioi. 
the qood cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
in Jackson v. &rown/ 904 p.2d t 
pn|t ( me Court stated the following: 
[W]e see no benetit in discouraging or 
penalizing persons who realize, before making 
these vows, that for whatevei" reason, they 
are unprepared to take such an important 
step. Plaintiff in this case concedes that I: 
we were to uphold the action, any time an 
engaged party were to cancel wedding plans 
for any reason, the other party would have a 
prima facie case for breach of promise to 
marry. Such an action would be highly 
L
 1 ceptibie to abuse by persons whose 
feelings are damaged by a former fiancee's 
decision to cancel a wedding. In Norton, we 
held that actions so manipulable and 
vulnerable to this type of abuse are 
"counterproductive" to the good of the state. 
An action which would accrue any time a 
person, for whatever reason, cancels or 
indefinitely postpones wedding plans is 
<A 
contrary to the public policy of this state. 
Not only would such an action be readily 
amenable to abuse, but it would discourage 
individuals with legitimate doubts or 
concerns about a planned wedding from 
cancelling the event. Encouraging people to 
marry out of fear of a lawsuit furthers no 
legitimate purpose and would undoubtedly 
cause many problems. 
Id. at 687. (Internal citations omitted). 
In the instant, Plaintiff has made no allegations of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress or fraud and 
although he has attempted to plead around Jackson, when the 
subject matter of the pleadings is considered1, it is clear 
Plaintiff's Complaint is based upon or arises out of a breach of 
a contract to marry-a cause of action which has been expressly 
abolished in Utah. 
In light of the forgoing, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with 
Prejudice is granted. With respect to sanctions, the Court is 
not persuaded Plaintiff's claims were brought frivolously, 
consequently, Defendant's request for sanctions of costs, fees 
and expenses is, respectfully, denied. 
DATED this 0 /day of April, 2006. 
Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and 
indulging all reasonable inferences therefrom, as required when 
ruling on a motion to dismiss. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light 
Co. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). 
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Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice and for Sanctions. 
The Court heard oral argument with respect to the motion on Anr 
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engaged party were to cancel wedding plans 
for any reason, the other party would have a 
prima facie case for breach of promise to 
marry. Such an action would be highly 
susceptible to abuse by persons whose 
feelings are damaged by a former fiancee's 
decision tc :ancel a wedding. In Norton, we 
held that actions so manipulable and . 
vulnerable to this type of abuse axe 
"counterproductive" to the good of the state. 
An action which would accrue any time a 
person, for whatever reason, cancels or 
indefinitely postpones wedding plans is 
contrary to the public policy of this state. 
Not only would such an action be readily 
amenable to abuse, but it would discourage 
individuals with legitimate doubts or 
concerns about a planned wedding from 
cancelling the event. Encouraging people to 
marry out of fear of a lawsuit furthers no 
legitimate purpose and would undoubtedly 
cause many problems. 
Id. at 687. (Internal citations omitted). 
In the instant, Plaintiff has made no allegations of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress or fraud and 
although he has attempted to plead around Jackson, when the 
subject matter of the pleadings is considered1, it is clear 
Plaintiff's Complaint is based upon or arises out of a breach of 
a contract to marry-a cause of action which has been expressly 
abolished in Utah. 
In light of the forgoing, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with 
Prejudice is granted. With respect to sanctions, the Court is 
not persuaded Plaintiff's claims were brought frivolously, 
consequently, Defendant's request for sanctions of costs, fees 
and expenses is, respectfully, denied. 
DATED this Jjjyday of April, 2006. 
Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and 
indulging all reasonable inferences therefrom, as required when 
ruling on a motion to dismiss. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light 
Co. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). 
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The Court having so ruled, and good cause shown, 
IT IS ORDERED: 
That this action in its entirety be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
DONE this Jh day of April, 2006. 
BYT! 
Hortl 
Third! DistncT"Coilrt Judge 
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